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TIMELY DISCLOSURE - THE VIEW FROM 11 WALL STREET
by
Phillip L. West*
T HE ACTIVITY of a company's stock in the market is often the best
gauge of how well the company has translated timely disclosure policy
into timely disclosure practice. More importantly, the marketplace can
often give the corporation a good indication of whether confidential infor-
mation has leaked out and of the existence of potentially actionable insider
trading.
For instance, just before the opening of trading here at the New York
Stock Exchange one day recently, a specialist noticed an unusually heavy
influx of buy orders in one of his stocks but no readily apparent news to
account for this influx. The specialist was willing to sell stock from his
own account to meet a large portion of the demand,. but this was still
insufficient. After a brief consultation with a floor governor, it was decided
to delay the opening of the stock. The Department of Stock List was noti-
fied of the delay and immediately made a routine check with the company.
The company said it had just been unofficially informed that it was being
awarded a large contract for components. The contract was expected to
have a major impact on its earnings. However, the company pointed out,
it still had no official confirmation and could make no announcement. The
long delay in getting official confirmation on the contract and in distribut-
ing an announcement held up the opening of the company's stock until
the following morning.
This situation, although somewhat unusual, contains all of the elements
of a typical problem in timely disclosure. Just as typically, it could and
should have been avoided. This is the goal of the Exchange's timely dis-
closure policy: the avoidance of any disruption of the orderly market
process because of inadequate-or unfair or improper-disclosure practices.
Determining Materiality. The Exchange's disclosure policy is more of a
common-sense guideline to ethical behavior than a legal document, since it
was designed to aid listed companies in selecting the correct solution to
situations that often have no one pat answer. The heart of our policy is
contained in the first sentence of the disclosure section of the Company
Manual: "A corporation whose stock is listed on the, New York Stock
Exchange is expected to release quickly to. the public .any news or informa-
tion which might reasonably be expected to materially
. 
affect the market for
scurities."1 Although. designed specifically for .NYSE-listed compan.es,
this policy could be followed by anY publicly owned corporation seeking
effective disclosure.
* Vice President, New York Stock Exchange. Mr. West is a graduate of New York University
School of Commerce, Accouits, arid Finance, where he majored in Banking and Finance.'
1 N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, COM XANY MANUAL A-18..(1968).
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Of course, the first step in achieving this goal is accurately to determine
what constitutes material information. There are many items which are
obviously material, such as quarterly and annual reports, dividend an-
nouncements, mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, and major management
changes. But materiality is not always so easily determined. One gauge of
materiality is the "reasonable man" principle described in Judge Friendly's
decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur-information is material if it would prompt
a reasonable man to make an investment decision This still leaves the
problem of selecting a "reasonable man" out of an investing population
which includes every degree of investor sophistication from rank amateur
to professional.
We have developed our own gauge of materiality to avoid this compli-
cation. We think it is better for the individual executive responsible to ask
himself this question: "Would this information prompt me to risk my own
funds?" If the answer is yes, then immediate disclosure should be made.
Even with this guideline it is possible to be doubtful on rare occasions. In
this case, we suggest an even simpler rule of thumb: "When in doubt-
disclose."
Disclosure Security. Usually, it is far better to make disclosure than to risk
the possibility of violating Exchange or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission rules, but there are times when a corporation may, for one reason
or another, wish to defer disclosure until an appropriate time. In these
cases, disclosure can be properly avoided, but only if the information can
be kept confidential. The corporation should be extremely conscious of the
fact that information leaks, particularly when accompanied by insider
trading, not only damage management's reputation for integrity but also
put the company in danger of a stockholder suit.
The Exchange strongly urges that a corporation exercise extreme care in
guarding confidential information until ready for broad publication. Where
possible, any discussions of material information should be limited to a
small group of the top management of the company or companies involved,
and their individual confidential advisors, where adequate security can be
maintained. This security must at times be extreme. When one major listed
company was considering a stock split a few years ago the discussions were
kept so secret that only three of the company's top executives knew about
it. No memos or written notes were kept of their discussions. There was not
even a hint of the proposal to directors until they were asked to vote on it.Contrast this with a situation that occurred with another listed company.
The company's stock suddenly attracted unusually heavy demands with no
apparent reason. Our investigation revealed that that company was a take-
over candidate but, the company said, only a very few people knew about
it. Further investigation showed most of the buy orders were from the
company's home town. We later learned that the townspeople had quite
logically deduced what was going on when four accountants from a major
2SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
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New York firm checked into a motel for several days and traveled by cab
to the company's office.
Generally, security can be easily maintained within the corporation, but
at some point during merger and acquisition negotiations it becomes neces-
sary for the corporation to involve outsiders to conduct preliminary studies
or assist in other preparations such as business appraisals, tentative financing
arrangements, engineering studies, and so forth. Our experience has shown
that at this point it becomes impossible for the corporation to maintain
security, and in all fairness a press release should be issued. The extent of
disclosures at this point will depend on the state of negotiations, discussions,
and studies, but should, so far as possible, be definite as to price ratio,
timing, and/or any other pertinent information necessary to permit a
reasonable evaluation of the matter. As a minimum, these disclosures should
include all disclosures made to outsiders.
If the initial announcement cannot be specific, it should be supplemented
as more definitive terms, or different terms, are discussed or determined.
During merger and acquisition negotiations, the corporation should watch
closely the activity of its stock and, if unusual market activity should arise,
be prepared to make immediate public announcement. In addition, the
company should regularly remind employees as well as directors and officers,
that they must not disclose confidential information learned in the course
of business nor attempt to take advantage of such information themselves.
Situations will also arise in which a corporation may rightly avoid or
defer a public announcement. This type of situation often occurs in the
area of product development. A few years ago when the shares of water
desalinization companies were the glamour stocks of the market, one of
our listed companies came to us with a problem. They had developed a
process for desalting water but were not yet sure if the process was com-
mercially feasible. They had kept the process secret until this time. Al-
though they felt an announcement should be made, they were reluctant to
inflate unduly the price of their stock. Under ordinary circumstances the
process should have been disclosed, but, since its commercial feasibility was
still unknown, there was justification in delaying the announcement, pro-
vided secrecy could be maintained. A few months and several hundred
thousand dollars later, the process was abandoned. The company had saved
itself and the investing public many headaches by withholding its press
release until it was more definite about the potential of its process.
Press Releases. Publishing a press release fulfills only part of a corporation's
disclosure obligation. The corporation is also responsible for insuring that
news will be handled in the proper perspective by exercising appropriate
restraint, good judgment, and careful adherence to the facts. Premature
announcements of new products whose commercial application cannot yet
be realistically evaluated should be avoided. So too should overly optimistic
forecasts, exaggerated claims, and unwarranted promises. If subsequent
developments indicate that performance will not match earlier projections,
19701
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
this too should be reported and explained. Financial projections fall into
the same category and can, should expectations go awry, cause problems.
Any projection of financial data should be soundly based, appropriately
qualified, conservative, and factual. Likewise, excessive or misleading con-
servatism should also be avoided. Repetitive release of essentially the same
information is similarly inappropriate.
Security Analysts. Not all disclosures are made in press releases. Occasion-
ally major announcements are made inadvertently at meetings with security
analysts. Analysts have become increasingly important in evaluating and
interpreting the financial affairs of listed companies. The analyst working
for financial institutions, such as mutual funds, trust funds, insurance
companies, banks, or pension funds, plays a particularly important role
since the sizable investments of these institutions can have substantial
impact on trading in a company's stock.
The Exchange recommends that corporations observe an "open door"
policy in their relations with security analysts as well as financial writers,
shareholders, and others who have a legitimate investment interest in the
company's affairs. However, a company should not give information to
one inquirer that it would not give to another nor should it reveal informa-
tion it would not willingly give to the press for publication. A corporation
should never give advance earnings, dividend, stock splits, merger, or ten-
der information to analysts whether they represent an institution, a brok-
erage house, an investment advisor, a large stockholder, or anyone else. At
the same time, the corporation should not withhold any information in
which the inquirer has warrantable interest. We realize, of course, that
occasionally discussions with analysts may inadvertently lead to the revela-
tion of material information. However, if material information is discussed,
the information should be simultaneously released to the public.
Many corporations appear regularly before various analysts' groups. The
majority of these groups open their meetings to members of the press;
however, a few do not, or occasionally an invitation to the press may be
inadvertently overlooked. The corporation should, whenever possible,
attempt to have the press in attendance when substantive material is going
to be discussed. If the press cannot attend, a press release should be issued,
covering the substantive material to be reported. It is only fair to point out
that the competent security analyst depends on his professional skills and
his broad industry knowledge in making his evaluations and does not need
to depend on inside information which would provide him with an unfair
advantage.
Insider Trading. During the past few years several stockholder suits have
been filed, charging officers or directors with trading in their own stock
on the basis of "inside" information. Our experience has shown that many
stockholders feel that their directors and officers should have a meaningful
investment in the companies they manage. Naturally their investments
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should not be made at the advantage of stockholders or the investing
public.
As shareholders themselves, directors are more likely to represent the
viewpoint of other shareholders, whose interests they are charged with
protecting. Similarly, officers-the executive management group-may well
perform more effectively with the incentive of stock options. However, the
widespread endorsement of director and officer shareownership brings with
it questions that concern the timing of their stock transactions. For in-
stance, when may a director or officer properly buy or sell shares of his
company's stock? When is it appropriate to award stock options to key
executives? There are no simple uniform answers to these questions, but
they do underscore the importance of a policy of adequate timely disclosure
both for the benefit of the investing public and for the protection of
management.
NYSE Suggested Policy. Because of the sensitive position of officers and
directors in regard to their intimate knowledge in the corporation's affairs,
a company should consider establishing a policy which would place the
stock transaction of officers and directors above suspicion. The Exchange
suggests that corporations consider adopting one or more of the following
policies:
1. Establishing a regular investment program where the officer makes
periodic purchases and where the timing of purchases is not controlled by
the individual.
2. Requesting officials not to buy or sell stock for a thirty-day period
commencing one week after the annual report has been mailed to stock-
holders or otherwise broadly circulated.
3. Requesting officials to avoid transactions unless the officer or director
contacts the chief executive officer of the company to find out if there are
any important developments pending which need to be made public before
an insider could properly participate in the market.
4. Requesting officials to delay any purchases or sales until at least
twenty-four hours after the release of material information. This will
insure that adequate dissemination of the news has taken place.
5. Requesting officials to avoid transactions when developments of major
importance are expected to reach the appropriate time for announcement
within the next few months.
In granting stock options to key officers and directors, the same philoso-
phy that relates to purchases and sales may well apply. Where an established
pattern or formula is part of a plan specifically approved by shareholders,
a question of timing may not arise. When taking up an option, the timing
of the purchase is not usually critical since the price is set at the time the
option is granted. This reasoning might also apply to stock purchase plans
in which officers and directors may be entitled to participate.
The same consideration applies to the families or close associates of offi-
cers and directors who are presumed to have preferential access to informa-
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tion. As far as the public is concerned these individuals are also insiders.
And while this assumption may be unjustified in many cases, it is a fact of
life which those in positions of leadership and responsibility cannot ignore.
Conclusion. The corporate directors and officers have a special responsibility
in the area of timely disclosure. As officials of publicly owned corporations
they invited the public to become part owners of the corporation and its
assets. Surely these assets include the information possessed by the company.
The value of this data is often reflected in the price movement of the com-
pany's stock. When a corporate official violates or abrogates this fiduciary
obligation, he is doing so at the expense of the owners of the corporation.
The Exchange's disclosure policy, or any disclosure policy for that mat-
ter, seeks to avoid any disruption of an orderly market process by assuring
that all investors have equal access to material information. If a corporation
strives towards this goal, it cannot possibly violate either the letter or the
spirit of disclosure practices.
